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ABSTRACT
DEFY: A Deniable File System for Flash Memory
Timothy M. Peters
While solutions for file system encryption can prevent an adversary from determin-
ing the contents of files, in situations where a user wishes to hide even the existence
of data, encryption alone is not enough. Indeed, encryption may draw attention to
those files, as they most likely contain information the user wishes to keep secret, and
coercion can be a very strong motivator for the owner of an encrypted file system to
surrender their secret key.
Herein we present DEFY, a deniable file system designed to work exclusively
with solid-state drives, particularly those found in mobile devices. Solid-state drives
have unique properties that render previous deniable file system designs impractical
or insecure. Further, DEFY provides features not offered by any single prior work,
including: support for multiple layers of deniability, authenticated encryption, and an
ability to quickly and securely delete data from the device. We have implemented a
prototype based on the YAFFS and WhisperYaffs file systems. An evaluation shows
DEFY performs comparatively with WhisperYaffs.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Encrypted file systems are the typical solution to protecting sensitive data. Our
current encryption mechanisms cannot be broken in a reasonable amount of time
if we assume that our adversaries are confined to a brute force approach. In some
cases, however, adversaries are more powerful and are able to use coercion to achieve
their means. In these cases, standard encrypted file systems are insufficient because
they leak the existence of encrypted data–potentially even the size of that data. This
scenario is where deniable file systems become useful.
Deniable file systems have been a subject of research since their introduction in
1998 [15]. Since that time there have been many valuable contributions to the field.
To our knowledge, however, all previous deniable file systems have been designed for
magnetic disk drives–or related technologies. The assumptions that previous authors
made in their deniable file system designs are not valid if those designs are applied
to flash memory. Flash must be treated differently. In this work we present what we
believe to be the first deniable file system for flash memory.
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The Prevalence of Flash
Mobile devices are becoming increasingly ubiquitous and powerful. They collect
and store large amounts of personal or sensitive information. Some users need to
protect that data from unauthorized access just as they would on normal platforms.
Evidence of this need can be found on the Android Play store where there are a
number of privacy-enhancing technology apps. These apps include: ChatSecure [9]
(secure texting), WhisperYaffs [7] (an encrypted file system), RedPhone [5] (encrypted
calls), TextSecure [6] (secure texting), Orbot [10] (tor for mobile), Lookout [11] (data
backups and anti-virus), and many more.
The standard method of preventing unauthorized access to information on mobile
devices is the same as in general secure communication: encryption. While encryption
serves to limit access to certain files, it does not attempt to hide their existence. In
fact, encryption reveals the existence (and often, size) of information that the user
does not want others to see.
In many environments, allowing an adversary to learn that a device contains
sensitive data may be as damaging as the loss or disclosure of that data. Consider
covert data collection in a hostile country, where mobile devices carrying information
might be examined and imaged at border checkpoints. Inspectors may discover the
presence of encrypted data, or identify changes to the encrypted file system over time,
and demand that they be decrypted before allowing passage. This is not a fictional
scenario. In 2012, a videographer smuggled evidence of humans rights violations
out of Syria. He lacked any data protection mechanisms and instead hid a micro-
SD card in a wound on his arm [28]. In another example, the human rights group
Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma (ND-Burma) collects data on
hundreds of thousands of human rights violations by the Burmese government. They
collect testimony from witnesses within the country that the Burmese government
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would not want released, putting both activists and witnesses in grave danger should
the government gain access to that data [8]. In light of the control exerted by the
government over the Internet within Burma [34], ND-Burma activists carry data on
mobile devices, risking exposure at checkpoints and border crossings. Risk to activists
and witnesses could be lessened if this group used a mechanism to hide their data
such that inspectors couldn’t reasonably infer its existence on devices.
Deniable File Systems
The common solution to securing data under the aforementioned situations is a
class of file system known as deniable file systems. Deniable file systems mask all
information about the stored data, and provide a user with a means to plausibly
deny any storage artifacts on their device, typically by encrypting data with different
keys based on the sensitivity level selected for the data. In this paper we present
DEFY, the Deniable Encrypted File System for YAFFS. DEFY is specifically de-
signed for flash-based, solid-state drives—the primary storage device found in most
mobile devices. The physical properties of flash memory introduces unique challenges
to plausible deniability. In particular, hardware-implemented wear leveling essen-
tially forces DEFY to embrace a log-structured design. All known methods to ensure
security and prevent data loss (i.e. resulting from overwriting hidden blocks) are inap-
plicable in this setting, as are strategies that require in-place modification of blocks.
This causes DEFY to take a significant departure from previous deniable file system
designs.
DEFY also provides a number of features not previously offered in prior work:
• DEFY has been designed to be resistant to a more powerful, and more realistic,
adversary than previously considered by the literature.
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• DEFY is supportive of an arbitrary number of user-defined, security levels;
• DEFY is the first encrypted file system for mobile devices to provide authenti-
cated encryption;
• DEFY provides a fast and efficient mechanism to securely delete data, allowing
individual files or the entire file system to be deleted in constant time.
4
CHAPTER 2
Background
Flash Memory
Pushed by demand for mobile devices, solid-state memory has become a popular
alternative to hard disk drives, due to its low power consumption, high speed, low
noise, and lack of moving mechanical parts (increasing durability). The evolution
of flash memory technology has been a balancing act between cost, capacity, perfor-
mance, lifespan, and granularity of access/erasure. The most recent generation of
flash is NAND flash. NAND is cheaper to manufacture and many more bytes fit into
a single die than in previous EEPROM and NOR technologies: current NAND chip
sizes are as large as 256GB.
The distinguishing qualities of flash memory require it to be treated differently
than disk drives. NAND offers random-access reads and writes at the page level,
but erasure occurs at the block level. For example, an 8GB NAND device with 212
blocks can write an individual page (4KB) but must erase at the granularity of a
block (256KB). After erasure, pages may be programmed once, and must be erased
before being programmed again. This is known as the program-erase cycle.
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Pages in NAND flash are accompanied by an Out of Bound (OOB) area that can
be used to contain metadata and error correction codes for the page’s data. Since
writes occur only at the page level, error correction must also occur at the page level,
and is often stored in the OOB.
Flash memory has a limited number of program-erase cycles before becoming
unreliable, and can range anywhere from 10,000 to 100,000 cycles. To extend their
life, many solid-state drives employ a wear leveling strategy, whereby drivers internally
distribute erasures and writes across the medium, evenly. This results in a disconnect
between the logical and physical block address space—rewriting data to a logical
address may result in that data being stored in two, separate physical blocks. Wear
leveling can be done statically or dynamically. A dynamic implementation does not
attempt to move information once it is written—or static. Instead, it allocates pages
based on a least-written count. Static implementations target the static data on the
device. They will move that static data if the pages it is stored on have been under-
utilized compared to other pages on the device. Most devices choose the dynamic
implementation for simplicity and speed [2].
On Linux, flash devices may be accessed using the memory technology device
(MTD) driver, which provides near “raw” access to the flash device. MTD provides
no write leveling, and thus no safeties to prevent cell overuse. Unsorted block images
(UBI) is a higher level flash interface that provides wear-leveling and volume man-
agement. A flash translation layer (FTL) can also be used to provide a simplified,
block-level interface, in exchange for a loss of low-level control over data placement
and strict overwrites [3].
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Secure Deletion
Secure deletion is the process of permanently deleting data. Data is considered to
be securely deleted if it has been irrevocably removed from a physical medium. Even if
an adversary later gained access to that device and its decryption keys (if applicable),
they should be unable to retrieve the deleted data. This can be accomplished by de-
stroying the device, which is usually undesirable, or by making the data permanently
inaccessible. The most conventional secure deletion mechanism is overwriting data
after it has been erased, which was proposed by Gutman [21]. This method works well
for devices that allow data to be updated in-place, like magnetic disk drives. Reardon
et al. separate devices into those with in-place updates (like magnetic disk drives)
and those without in-place updates (like flash devices and tape-drives) [32]. Without
in-place updates, it can be impossible to know if a piece of data has been erased unless
the entire device is erased. An alternative to erasing the entire drive is to zero-fill
all of the space on the drive that is unused. Unfortunately, a flash controller’s write
leveler (discussed in section 2) may choose to ignore the zero-fill requests and instead
just mark the pages as erased instead of actually zero-filling them. In short, there is
no simple way to ensure secure deletion on write-leveled flash memory, which makes
it extremely difficult to extend security to flash devices.
An alternative method to overwriting data is to delete it cryptographically. Swan-
son and Wei [41] proposed encrypting all data on a flash device with a single key.
The data on the device can be securely erased by securely erasing that key. Reardon
et al. [33] advanced this idea by suggesting that each page should be encrypted with
its own key. This allows the granularity of secure deletion to be reduced to the page
level. Obviously, this method still requires a small secondary file system where the
keys can be stored, but it also brings page-level secure deletion to devices without
in-place updates. This is the only way that we know of to provide secure deletion on
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flash devices.
Authenticated Encryption
Standard encryption methods only ensure the confidentiality of data—they keep
it secret—they do not provide integrity—the ability to know if the data has been
modified. The user of a standard encrypted file system would be unable to directly
detect a change to the ciphertext during the decryption process, an thus such a change
could go unnoticed. Authenticated encryption [16] provides both confidentiality and
integrity to encrypted data. This ensures that if data is decrypted correctly, the
content is what was originally encrypted. This property is particularly synergistic in
environments where storage devices may be ceased for inspection.
Authenticated encryption requires message expansion—the ciphertext is larger
than the original plaintext. Existing work in encrypting file systems (e.g. [12, 17, 42])
use only unauthenticated block ciphers, which preserve message size, to meet the
alignment constraints of block-based storage devices. In practice, additional storage
must be found for the bits of the ciphertext expansion.
The process of encrypting data takes a plain text and produces a ciphertext and
an authentication tag. The authentication tag is generated by a Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC) or hash function. The ciphertext and the authentication tag can be
created in three ways. The most secure method of authenticated encryption is to en-
crypt the message data and then hash that ciphertext to generate the authentication
tag. In reverse, the ciphertext is rehashed and validated against the given authenti-
cation tag. Without breaking the hash function, an adversary shouldn’t be able to
modify the ciphertext or the authentication tag in anyway that is undetectable.
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Encrypted File Systems
There are currently two options for encrypted file systems: encrypted file systems
or full disk encryption. Encrypted file systems encrypt data at the file system level.
The meta-data to those files may or may not be encrypted along with the files. Blaze
presents an encrypted file system that works with the standard Unix file system
interface and encrypts the associated meta-data [17]. Wright produced another such
encrypted file system that works at the user level [42].
Full disk encryption schemes encrypt data at the block-device driver level. These
encryption schemes usually lack visibility of actual files. Instead they ensure that
each block on the device is encrypted regardless of its contents. TrueCrypt is one
such full disk encryption scheme [12], WhisperYaffs is another [7].
Deniable File Systems
The unique quality of a deniable file system over an encrypted file system is that it
is impossible to prove the existence of any file or files in the deniable file system–thus
a stored file’s existence is always deniable. In general, this deniability is achieved by
making the entire file system appear to be random noise. Using a set of keys, the user
can unlock parts of a deniable file system while leaving the rest as apparent noise.
Even when the entire file system is unlocked, the noise persists in some areas. This
prevents an adversary from being able to know when all of the files have been retrieved
from the file system. Typically, the adversary to the users of these file systems has
the power to force a user to give up at least one key to that file system. Thus, they
usually rely on the user to separate sensitive data from normal data and only provide
access keys to the non-sensitive data when coerced.
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Threat Models
There are two types of adversaries that this file system was designed to protect
against: the single-view adversary and the snapshot adversary. It is assumed that
these adversaries will know everything about how DEFY works and will guess that it
is in use if they find anything related to it on a device. In the context of adversaries, an
access to the device provides that adversary with a complete raw copy of the device.
The adversaries should be unable to prove the existence of any sensitive data if the
user sets up the file system correctly and does not reveal the keys to that sensitive
data.
Single-View Adversary
The single-view adversary is one who is able to access the file system and its
user once. Among other scenarios, this models some sort of checkpoint where the file
system of a device is inspected. The inspectors may ask for a password to the device
and attempt to inspect a raw dump of the device. It assumes that the inspectors will
not save the image and associate it with a particular device or individual.
Snapshot Adversary
The snapshot adversary is very similar to the single-view adversary, but the in-
spectors are allowed multiple accesses to the device. They keep the raw images of the
device device between checkpoints. Then, by comparing two different raw dumps of
the device the inspectors could determine which pages of memory have changed.
This adversary has some very real use cases. An example of a snapshot adversary
is a country with multiple security checkpoints that communicate data about their
visitors. A reporter would need to pass through a checkpoint on the way into the
10
country and on the way out. That reporter may also need to pass through other
checkpoints within the country. Thus the reporter would need to pass through at
least two checkpoints, and would need a file system that was strong enough to protect
sensitive data against that level of intrusion.
11
CHAPTER 3
DEFY: Overview
DEFY is a deniable file system that is specifically designed for flash memory. It
was implemented as a Linux kernel module based on previous work in both YAFFS
and WhisperYaffs.
Dependencies
YAFFS
YAFFS is a file system designed for use on raw NAND flash memory. Due to its
simplicity, portability, and small memory footprint, YAFFS is commonly used as the
default file system in many mobile devices, including the Android operating system.
YAFFS is a true log-structured file system [37, 39] in that write requests are allocated
sequentially within the logical address space. Its design is largely motivated by a
desire to integrate device-level wear leveling. Next, we briefly summarize YAFFS’s
design; for a more thorough description, we direct readers to Manning [26] and other
resources, such as Schmitt et al. [38].
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Terminology and Data Structures
YAFFS is described by its designer, Charles Manning [26], using terminology that
is slightly different than that of traditional file systems. Every YAFFS partition is
compromised of a set of blocks, and each block is composed of some number of chunks.
The unit of allocation is the chunk, which ranges in size from 512-bytes to 32KB and
corresponds to one or more pages in the underlying NAND technology. The unit
of erasure is the block, with a capacity of 32–128 chunks, depending on the NAND
block capacity. YAFFS uses the OOB space provided by a flash device to store chunk
metadata and an error correction code.
We remark that there are two versions of YAFFS: YAFFS1 and YAFFS2. The key
distinctions between these are two fold: (1) YAFFS1 was designed to work with page
sizes up to 1KB while YAFFS2 supports larger pages, and (2) YAFFS2 implements a
true log-structured file system, performing no overwrites when new data are written.
For further details on the differences of these versions, see Manning [26]. This paper
refers exclusively to the YAFFS2 design, thus we use the terms YAFFS2 and YAFFS
interchangeably.
Every YAFFS entity (files, directories, links, etc.) is maintained as an object, with
an object header. Each object header stores metadata about its respective object,
including the object name, size, and location of data chunks. A directory’s object
header contains the location of the object headers for its subdirectories and files.
Writing
Write requests are divided into chunks, allocated and written sequentially fol-
lowing the leading edge of the log (the last chunk written). If the leading edge is
the last chunk of a block, YAFFS searches for the next block past the leading edge
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that is empty or available for allocation. Every chunk is assigned a sequence num-
ber—stored in the OOB section of memory. The sequence number is monotonically
increasing—i.e. the last chunk written has the highest sequence number—making it
the new leading edge of the log. The leading edge is the starting point for the system
when searching for the next chunk to allocate.
When a file’s contents are updated, the affected data chunks are rewritten to the
device into new chunks. The old chunks are not affected during the rewrite process,
but the new chunks that contain the most recent information are assigned higher
sequence numbers. These sequence numbers allows YAFFS to find and use only the
most up-to-date chunks. Chunks individually store which parent object they belong
to, so the parent objects do not need to be modified each time a chunk is updated.
Similar actions are triggered when any other parts of the file system are modified.
Mounting
As in LFS, YAFFS supports special objects known as checkpoints, which commit
information about the state of the file system to the drive. On mount, YAFFS
searches for the most recent checkpoint to reconstruct in-memory data structures. In
the absence of a checkpoint, YAFFS scans the entire disk, creating a list of blocks,
sorted by sequence number. Then, in descending order, it examines the contents of
each block. Invalid chunks are ignored and every valid chunk in the block is added
to a corresponding in-memory object (creating an object, if necessary).
Unlike most disk files systems (e.g. ext2/3/4, NTFS, HFS+), a YAFFS partition
does not need to be formatted before being mounted. If no valid objects or checkpoints
are found during mounting, all blocks are marked as available for allocation.
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Whisper YAFFS
WhisperYaffs is a system for providing full disk encryption (confidentiality without
authenticity) on flash devices [7]. A prototype version of it was released to GitHub by
WhisperSystems in 2011. Currently, WhisperYaffs isn’t a product offered by Whis-
perSystems nor does it seem to be under active development. For this project, we
updated that GitHub version of WhisperYaffs to work with a more modern Linux 3.8
kernel.
The full disk encryption that WhisperYaffs provides is created using AES-XTS
encryption. AES-XTS uses ciphertext stealing to enable encryption of sections of data
that are not divisible by the AES block size. Ciphertext stealing takes the ciphertext
from an encrypted block and uses it to pad the non-AES-sized block up to the AES
block size so that it may be encrypted. This is used to encrypt the OOB section
of a chunk, which varies in size, but is smaller than an AES block. WhisperYaffs
first encrypts the data of a chunk and then proceeds to steal ciphertext from that
encryption to encrypt the OOB section. Both the data and the OOB section of a
chunk must be retrieved to decrypt either.
XTS mode requires both a key and a tweak. WhisperYaffs uses two separate
tweaks, one for each encryption (chunk and OOB area). When the chunk data is
encrypted, WhisperYaffs uses the logical chunk address multiplied by two. For the
second encryption of the OOB data, WhisperYaffs encrypts using the logical address
multiplied by two plus one. Thus, the two tweaks are related but unique for each
chunk in the device.
The encryption key that WhisperYaffs uses is randomly generated when the file
system is created. It is stored in the first good block of the flash device. That block
is subsequently hidden from the rest of the file system and encrypted using the user
password—which is expanded through PBKDF2.
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Interestingly, the designers of WhisperYaffs chose not to encrypt the sequence
number of the chunks. This does not leak any of the contents of the device, but it
could be used to determine which chunks were changed most recently. If an adversary
had two disk images he could determine which chunks had changed and thus determine
an upper bound on the amount of changed data.
System Overview
Like WhisperYaffs, DEFY encrypts each chunk including the OOB areas resulting
in a full disk encryption. What distinguishes DEFY from WhiserYaffs and YAFFS,
is its ability to obfuscate the existance of data.
The general architecture of DEFY can be separated into a few key components.
The layout of these components is presented in figure 3.1 and each component is
briefly discussed below.
Operating System Interaction
DEFY is a Linux kernel module, and as such it implements the Virtual File System
(VFS) interface. The VFS interface allows the operating system to ask for a plethora
of information from DEFY. This can include file, directory, or general file system
information. It also allows the operating system to instruct DEFY to perform certain
actions–like mounting and unmounting. The VFS interface is common to all Unix
file systems so we will leave a discussion of its full requirements and specifications to
other literature.
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Figure 3.1: A high-level system view of the DEFY kernel module.
File Objects
Each file, directory, and link that is contained in DEFY is mapped to a specific
file system object. Just like YAFFS, all of these file objects are held in memory while
DEFY is mounted. The in-memory object contains all pertinent information about
itself, its attached data blocks, and each of its data chunks’ stubs (discussed below).
Objects also contain links to their children and parents, these can be used to traverse
the file object tree. Each file object can be found using its unique name or associated
object number.
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Block Manager
The block manager tracks the state of each erase block on the device. The state
of each of these blocks is determined on mount and then updated as changes occur.
DEFY’s list of possible block states is shorter than YAFFS (see [26]). It allows for
blocks to be: allocating, dead, assumed empty, or used. DEFY can only assume that
blocks are empty because all blocks are technically used at all times. This is part of
the deniability framework that ensures that no block looks different from any other
if no keys are present.
Stub Manager
The encryption process for each chunk generates a matching stub that is required
to decrypt that chunk. The stub manager manages these stubs and provides an
interface to access them in the system. It does not generate stubs, instead it simply
arranges them. Given either a logical chunk index or a file object pointer, the stub
manager can find the correct stub or stubs to decrypt the associated data from the
device. It can also store stubs, delete stubs, and iterate through stubs.
Cryptography
Everything that is encrypted or hashed must be sent through the cryptography
module. It also provides functions to generate more secure random numbers and
expand passwords based on PBKDF2. Note that, like WhisperYaffs, we did not
implement our own cryptographic primitives. We rely on the Linux kernel to provide
the actual randomization, hashing, and encryption functions.
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Device IO
The device IO module deals with reading and writing data to the flash device–
which includes the OOB data. Like YAFFS, DEFY is designed to work with the MTD
interface. At this level DEFY may write and read directly from specific pages on the
flash device. Corrupted and damaged pages are not hidden from DEFY, the MTD
interface will return read or write errors that DEFY notes in the block manager.
DEFY could be ported to work on top of a UBI or a FTL as long as another
device was present that could support secure deletion, but we leave this to the future
work discussion in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 4
DEFY: Design
DEFY is designed as an extension to the YAFFS file system, with security features
inspired by WhisperYaffs. We chose YAFFS because it is designed to operate on
raw NAND flash, handles wear-leveling, is widely-deployed, and is open-source. To
YAFFS we add authenticated encryption, cryptographic secure deletion, and support
for multiple deniability levels that are resistant to strong adversaries. A comparison
of DEFY’s features with existing work appears in Chapter 7. The following provides
a high-level description of DEFY’s main design features.
This is our second implementation of DEFY. Our first deniable file system design
was implemented using dummy blocks. We, however, found a vulnerability in that
design and discarded it. For interest, a discussion of that design is included in the
appendix (see 8). Our second design appears to be strong against the single-visit
adversary and the snapshot adversary.
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Privilege Levels
Like many previous deniable file systems, DEFY separates files into one or more
privilege levels. The exact number of levels created is specified by the user. The
system maintains no record of how many levels exist in the system; it can only know
which levels are currently open. When a user reveals a level, all lower levels are also
revealed. This is a convenience that helps to minimize the chance of overwriting (see
4) and follows the conventions of previous work.
When mounted, privilege levels appear as directories under the root directory of
the file system. Each of these top-level directories is associated with a unique name
(like level 0, level 1, .., level n). All files for a deniability level are located below its
top-level directory. Assigning deniability to directories at the root level is strategic
and provides a number of advantages. Level directories allow for easy inheritance of
deniability levels. Objects created within a directory will, by default, inherit the level
of that directory, i.e. be correctly encrypted at the appropriate level. We believe this
behavior to be quite natural, following the tradition of other security semantics (e.g.
file system permissions), and frees users of the burden of assigning deniability levels to
individual files. Separating deniability level namespaces through level directories, also
forces users to be more thoughtful, and perhaps, careful about how they categories
the sensitivity of their data.
Each of these levels are maintained like separate file systems but they exist in the
same logical address space on the device. This is necessary for our deniable encryption
scheme that is discussed in the following sections.
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Authenticated Encryption
The two key challenges associated in implementing authenticated encryption in
DEFY are: (1) designing a file system that can accommodate the data expansion that
results from authentication and, (2) designing an encryption scheme that is supportive
of efficient and granular secure deletion. Here, we focus our discussion on the former,
leaving a discussion of the latter for the next section (4).
DEFY’s encryption scheme is presented in figure 4.1. The algorithm takes as input
a data chunk, broken into n, 128-bit messages (p1, . . . , pn), the OOB data (oob), a
unique identifier for the chunk (id), a unique global counter (t), a level encryption key
(K`) and a level MAC key (M`). The algorithm implements an encrypt-then-MAC
scheme: first encrypting the data and OOB using AES in cbc mode (AES-CBC),
then MAC-ing the resulting ciphertext of the data using a SHA256-based message
authentication code (HMAC-SHA256).
The encryption of the OOB area is treated specially due to its inconsistent size.
The exact size of the OOB area depends on the flash device, but the majority of the
time it is not an even multiple of the AES block size–which is required to use the
AES encryption algorithm. To fix this problem, we perform ciphertext stealing from
c1: this takes ciphertext from c1 and appends to oob until there is a full AES block
size worth of data to encrypt. The result of the encryption operation is then stored
back in oob and c1–over the previously stolen ciphertext.
An additional cbc mode encryption is performed using the authenticator as its
key to complete an all-or-nothing transform (described later). A stub (s) is created
by XOR-ing all the ciphertext message blocks (x1, . . . , xn) with the authenticator (σ).
The resulting tag is small and not secret, rather, it is an expansion of the encrypted
data and is subject to the all-or-nothing property. The ciphertext (x1, . . . , xn) is
written to disk as data, the encrypted OOB (xoob) is written to the OOB area, and
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Input: Chunk Data p1, . . . , pn, OOB Data oob,
Chunk ID id, Level Constant t, Level Encryption Key
K`, MAC Key H`
1: ctr1 ← id||t||1||0128−|t|−|id|−1
2: c1, . . . , cn ← AES-CBCctr1K` (p1, . . . , pn)
3: xoob, c1 ← AES-CBCctr1+nK` (oob, c1)
4: σ ← HMAC-SHA256H(c1, ..., cn)
5: ctr2 ← id||t||0||0128−|t|−|id|−1
6: x1, . . . , xn ← AES-CBCctr2σ (c1, ..., cn)
7: s← σ ⊕ x1...⊕ xn
Output: Stub s, Ciphertext x1, . . . , xn,
Encrypted OOB Data xoob
Figure 4.1: Authenticated encryption for a single chunk in DEFY
the tag (t) is stored as metadata in the parent object.
The decryption algorithm is the exact opposite of this process and is presented in
figure 4.2. Note that due to the ciphertext stealing the encrypted OOB data must be
decrypted before the ciphertext blocks (c1, . . . , cn) can be decrypted. The decryption
process of OOB returns both the decryption of OOB and the stolen bytes of c1.
The same counter and key pair should never be used for encryption more than
once, so we use a chunk’s physical disk address for id and a global sequence counter
t; both characteristics exist within a DEFY object and, by policy, are non-repeatable
in a file system. The encryption key and MAC key are also distinct between levels.
We remark that other constructions for achieving all-or-nothing encryption, lever-
aging other cryptographic modes and algorithms, may provide better performance or
a more elegant design. For example, Steps 1,2, and 4 of Figure 4.1 may be combined
23
Input: Stub s, Ciphertext x1, . . . , xn, Chunk ID id,
Encrypted OOB Data xoob, Encryption key K`, MAC
key M`, Level Constant t
1: ctr2 ← id||t||0||0128−|t|−|id|−1
2: σ ← s⊕ x1...⊕ xn
3: c1, ..., cn ← AES-CBCctr2σ (x1, ..., xn)
4: σ′ ← HMAC-SHA256M`(c1, ..., cn)
5: if σ′ 6= σ then return Error
6: ctr1 ← id||t||1||0128−|t|−|id|−1
7: oob, c1 ← AES-CBCctr1+nK` (xoob, c1)
8: p1, ..., pn ← AES-CBCctr1K (c1, ..., cn)
Output: Chunk Data p1, . . . , pn, OOB Data oob
Figure 4.2: Authenticated decryption for a single chunk in DEFY
into a single call of OCB mode [36], which requires only one pass over the data and
is fully parallelizable. Our construction acts as proof-of-concept and an exemplar for
achieving our design goals.
Encryption-Based Deletion
The same AON transform that provides authenticated encryption, also provides
for a means for efficient and granular secure deletion. The original AON transform,
due to Rivest [35], is a cryptographic function that, given only a partial output, re-
veals nothing about its input. No single message of a ciphertext can be decrypted
in isolation without decrypting the entire ciphertext. The original intention of the
transform was to provide additional complexity to exhaustive search attacks, by re-
quiring an attacker to decrypt an entire message for each key guess. AON has been
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proposed to make secure an RSA padding scheme [16], to make efficient smart-card
transactions [18, 19, 22], message authentication [20], and threshold-type cryptosys-
tems using symmetric primitives [14].
Our design implements a encryption-based secure deletion scheme that is inspired
by Peterson et al.’s AON technique for secure deletion of versioned data [31]. The
all-or-nothing transform allows for any subset of a ciphertext block to be deleted (e.g.
through overwriting) in order to delete the entire ciphertext; without all the cipher-
text blocks, the chunk can never be decrypted. When combined with authenticated
encryption, the AON transform creates a message expansion that is bound to the same
all-or-nothing property. This small expansion becomes the stub (from section 4) and
can be efficiently overwritten to securely delete the corresponding chunk. Indeed,
message expansion is fundamental to our deletion model and the AON transform is
a natural construct for providing efficient secure deletion for DEFY, as it minimizes
the amount of data needed to be overwritten, does not complicate key management,
and conforms to our hierarchical deletion model.
Stub Management
As previously discussed (4 & 4), stubs are used in DEFY to support authenticated
encryption and secure deletion. They are stored both in the metadata of objects and
in a separate stub storage area, as shown in figure 4.3.
The metadata of an object is used to store stubs for its child objects: data chunks
in the case of a file object, or file objects in the case of a directory object. When a
child object is modified, the parent object is updated with a new stub, overwriting
the previous stub and securely deleting the old version of that information. As a
result of storing a new stub, the parent object is modified. Thus, creating, deleting
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or modifying any object in DEFY will trigger a stub rotation for all the tree objects
in the direct lineage of that object up to the top-level directory.
The objects that reside in the top-level directory are still secured using stubs,
those stubs are stored in the separate stub storage area that is written to another
file system. That separate file system must support secure deletion. Some examples
of just such a flash file system are presented by Reardon et al. [33] and Lee et al.
[25]–which is also built on top of YAFFS. It would be possible to implement a similar
secure deletion scheme in DEFY, but we will leave that for future work.
The stub storage area contains a map of chunk numbers and their associated
decryption stubs. It is stored in a stub file of fixed size. This imposes an upper
bound on the number of chunks in the top-level directory of the file system–other
directories lack this bound. The stub file’s size = the number of bytes per stub × the
number of allowed top-level chunks × the maximum number of levels. Each section
of the stub file that corresponds to a particular privilege level is then encrypted using
the appropriate key for that level of the file system. The encryption step hides the
plain text chunk locations that are used by a particular level. It would be difficult
to maintain deniability if the adversary knew exactly which chunks were used by
which level of the file system–including the unused levels. When chunk location and
matching stub data is encrypted, even changing a single byte in the stub list will
result in an entirely different output that is saved to disk.
The user may or may not use all of the available levels in DEFY. If the user
chooses not to use all of the levels, they may instruct DEFY to randomize those
sections of the stub storage area, to prevent sections of the stub storage area from
remaining constant (thus revealing their lack of use). Once the user randomizes the
storage area, it contents will be irrecoverable even with the correct key–this is also a
quick way to erase a level. Without a key, the snapshotting adversary would only be
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able to determine that one or more changes took place in the stub storage area. More
automatic constructions of this operation are possible, but are also less desirable due
to the destructive power of this operation.
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Figure 4.3: An example of how metadata (stubs) and data are stored in
DEFY. Note that the stub lists contain the chunk address (left) and the
stub value (right).
DEFY’s hierarchy of stubs architecture has a number of advantages to achieving
fine-grained and efficient secure deletion. Individual objects, be they chunks, files,
or directories, may be securely deleted by overwriting their corresponding stubs and
performing a stub rotation. This granularity extends to the top-level level directories,
allowing a user to securely delete an entire level or the entire file system by overwriting
the stub storage area as discussed. And because YAFFS, and thus DEFY, stores all
metadata objects in memory, stub rotations only affect in-memory structures in the
short term. This behavior limits the system’s standard performance overhead to the
computation of new stubs. Eventually, however, the memory structures are written
to disk and do require additional I/O.
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Placeholder Blocks
Placeholder blocks serve two purposes in DEFY: (1) they mark the current head of
the log for a particular level and (2) they aid in augmenting deniability. Placeholder
blocks were inspired by checkpoints, which are common in log-structured file systems
[37, 39]–including YAFFS.
Each time DEFY is unmounted it writes a placeholder block for each level. The
placeholder blocks for each level are written in order of greatest privilege to least
privilege (see figure 4.4). This places the least privileged level’s block last. Thanks
to DEFY’s convention of unlocking all levels in order, data from the least privileged
level will always be available if DEFY is mounted. By placing the least privileged
level’s block last, we can ensure that all file systems will know where the head of the
log is, and subsequently where to begin writing without overwriting data.
?  E E
Last Used Block
Level 2
Level 0
Level 1
Place Holder Blocks
? == Undecryptable Block
E == Assumed Empty Block
Figure 4.4: A multi-level view of the placeholder block order. The highest
privilege level’s block is written first and the lowest privilege level’s block
is written last.
The placeholder block is not a distinct block type–like a checkpoint block. Instead,
it is simply a block that was selected by the normal allocator (4) at the head of the file
system and filled with file objects from the top-level directory. The objects that are
written to the placeholder block follow the normal update cycle–where their previous
chunks are deleted. The benefit of using top-level objects is that the stub rotation
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process is brief.
The ordering of each level’s placeholder block ensures that the file system has a
consistent size no matter which levels are unlocked. It also ensures that a snapshot
adversary cannot determine anything about the existence of higher levels. For exam-
ple, if the order were reversed and the highest placeholder block were written last,
then the snapshot adversary could determine that seemingly empty blocks past the
end of the log had changed. That sort of pattern would lead the snapshot adversary
to realize there were unlocked levels.
If the file system is used without all levels unlocked then only the unlocked levels
will be written to placeholder blocks. Again, this is not problematic given that
DEFY loads the least privileged level first and writes that placeholder blocks last.
This protection scheme allows DEFY to avoid overwriting in most cases.
Chunk Allocation
The chunk allocator in DEFY has been designed to provide support for distinct
privilege levels and reduced data collisions. Its allocation scheme also eliminates the
need for a distinct garbage collector.
Unlike YAFFS, chunks and blocks are associated to a particular level in DEFY
(as shown in figure 4.5). As such, the chunk allocator will only assign chunks from
a particular level’s current chunk allocation block. When an allocation block is fully
written another block must be selected. The choice of block is the next block that
is undecrytable or assumed to be empty. The next block is usually the next physical
block, but may wrap around the end of the device.
Once the file system has wrapped around the end of the device it will continue to
choose blocks that appear to be empty—or are undecryptable. It may choose blocks
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Block: Allocating
Level 2
Chunks (bitmap):
 == Assigned Chunk
Block: Allocating
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 == Empty Chunk
Figure 4.5: This is an example of current allocation blocks from various
levels. It shows that three levels are currently in use and have open allo-
cation blocks.
that were previously erased—replacing the behavior of a garbage collector—or blocks
that are currently in use by unrevealed levels of the file system. The latter is the only
case where DEFY will overwrite data. For this reason, the user should only write
data when all levels of the file system have been revealed—thus guaranteeing that
DEFY will not overwrite data.
Due to flash hardware, a block must be erased before its individual chunks can be
rewritten. When a block is selected to be used for allocation it is erased. If that block
has not been fully utilized when the file system is closed, it is filled with random data
that is again encrypted using ephemeral stubs. This behavior mimics the strategy
that is used when the file system is initialized.
File System Operations
Initialization
When the user creates a new DEFY file system, he must provide the number of
levels he desires and a unique password for each. Each password is expanded using
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PBKDF2 using an appropriate number of iterations [23]. DEFY uses each password
to protect the randomly generated encryption key for that level. It also protects
the randomly generated hash key and level constant that are used in the encryption
process. All of this information is stored in a single erasable block at the beginning of
the file system. This is known as a key block. One key block is allocated per level even
if that level is not used. If the user chooses to use less than the maximum number
of levels allowed by the system, those blocks are effectively wasted. This waste is
necessary to prevent the adversary from being able to determine if a block has been
used or not and thus if a level exists or not. The unused blocks are encrypted with the
same procedure as the used blocks. The only difference is that a randomly generated
ephemeral key is used. DEFY ignores the existence of these key blocks for all other
file system operations. The effective 0th block for the file system is the first block
after the key blocks. An example layout of these key blocks can be seen in figure 4.6.
0 1 2 E E E
0
th
 Block 0
th
 FS Block
Key Blocks
Figure 4.6: A view of the key blocks of a 5 level file file system with only
the first 3 levels used. All file system operations and the block allocator
treat the 5th block (white) as the 0th block.
Note that DEFY will not write keys to bad key blocks. If a bad block is detected
in the key block area, that block will be skipped and the keys will be written to the
next block. This will result in holes in the key block area which leads to the 0th file
system block being offset further than the maximum number of key blocks. When
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the file system is mounted, DEFY compensates for these potential holes by iterating
forward from the first block on the device looking for key blocks.
The remaining blocks in the file system are erased, and then written with random
data. The actual data that we write to each chunk is randomly generated and then
encrypted with a random key. The data, its generated stub, and the key are all
thrown away between chunks. This method ensures that adversaries can only compare
the output of one encryption to the output of another encryption. If data were
generated randomly and then written directly to disk, the adversary would be allowed
to compare the output of a random number generator with the output of an encryption
function, which is less desirable.
The stub file is created at this time with enough space for every levels’ top-level
stubs. As discussed in 4, it is created on another file system that must support secure
deletion. The exact location of the file is user-definable. Its contents, even when
blank are encrypted using the level key that is stored in the matching key block.
The number of levels in the system could be changed if desired. To remove a level,
its key block and all of its associated file system blocks could be wiped and filled with
encrypted random data as previously discussed. Adding a level would be as simple as
replacing the next unused key block if space was available. If space wasn’t available,
the user could choose to remove a level and then re-use the old key block. This feature
does not currently exist in our implementation.
The total number of levels in our implementation is set to 30. This is an arbitrary
number, that can be changed easily if desired. A smaller maximum number of levels
results in reduced memory requirements but also reduces the potential for additional
levels.
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Mount
The actions to mount the DEFY file system are significantly different from those
of YAFFS [26]. YAFFS relies on sequence numbers to determine which chunks are
most up-to-date. Those sequence numbers are written to every chunk’s OOB area
regardless of their status as an object, data, or other type of chunk. When YAFFS
is mounted it can either use a checkpoint or scan through the sequence numbers on
the device. Using a checkpoint is preferable due to speed, but valid checkpoints are
not always available on the device. The scanning alternative consists of a number
of steps. First it pre-scans all of the chunks on the device looking for the highest
sequence number. As each chunk is scanned, it is added to a sorted list that is
ordered by sequence number. Second, that list is scanned in reverse. This guarantees
that the objects that are built reflect the most up to date information. If duplicates
objects are found later in the list, they are assumed to be out of date. This scanning
process is slow, especially with larger devices.
DEFY does not need to rely on sequence number scanning or checkpoints. Instead,
it takes advantage of its stub file and the fact that there are no out-of-date chunks
in in the file system. The stub file contains the roots–both chunk indexes and stub
keys–of each file object in the file system. DEFY uses that stub file as a starting
point and walks down through each key tree to build all of the necessary in-memory
information.
Placeholder blocks are used by DEFY, but they are mostly used for security
reasons as discussed in section 4. The mounting process treats placeholder blocks
like any other blocks. DEFY still iterates down the file tree and loads objects as
their keys are found. Objects that are part of the placeholder block are merely close
to the head of the file system. Thus, placeholder blocks have no effect on load-time
performance in DEFY.
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Read
A file read operation requires DEFY to determine which chunks contain the desired
information. Those chunks are then read in, decrypted, and verified using the data
chunk stubs that are stored in the DEFY file object for this file. This operation does
not change any of the contents of the device.
Write
To write new information, or update a portion of the file, DEFY needs to write
new chunks to the device. This is done by requesting new chunks from the chunk
allocator as discussed in section 4. Key stubs are then generated as the data to be
written to the newly allocated chunks is encrypted as discussed in section 4. Those
stubs are then stored in the active file’s stub map and the encrypted data is written to
the device. The file object is then re-written with the new stub map, which requires
a stub rotation for all objects who have this object as a descendent.
Links
DEFY supports both hard and soft links. They are represented by file system
objects in DEFY, which are created and encrypted just like a normal file object.
For security reasons, we limited links to only being able to point at content within
a specific level of the file system. They are not allowed to point between levels or
outside DEFY.
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Delete
File deletion simply removes that file’s object from memory and removes the stub
needed to decrypt that file from the disk. This triggers as stub rotation just like the
write operation.
Create
File creation creates a new DEFY file object. That object is written to disk using
a chunk that is assigned from the chunk allocator as discussed in 4. The decryption
stub for that chunk is then added to this object’s parent object which triggers a stub
rotation.
Discussion
We believe that DEFY is strong against both the single-visit and the snapshotting
adversary. In this section we discuss how DEFY is strong against both adversaries
and what is expected of the user to maintain their data security.
Assumptions
The first assumption that we make about DEFY is that the user will be well
informed. They should know generally how DEFY works and how to use it correctly.
For example, the user of DEFY must use strong passwords. All of the defense mech-
anisms of DEFY assume that the adversary cannot simply break the keys. It would
be far easier for an attacker to brute-force a set of weak passwords than determine if
the user of the file system is being truthful. Thus, we assume that a user of DEFY
will use strong passwords to protect their obviously valuable data.
35
We also assume that the device is free of malware. If the device is in anyway
compromised, the security of everything on it will also be compromised–including
DEFY. Malware could record all of the users passwords or even read data out of the
deniable file system once the user opened it.
Creating Deniability
The first and foremost goal of DEFY is to offer plausible deniability in the snapshot
adversary model—the strongest model considered in this setting. DEFY gains this
feature by using the computational indistinguishability provided by our encryption
scheme. Specifically, it should be hard for an adversary to distinguish file system
blocks that contain data from an unrevealed level, contain old/deleted data from a
revealed level, or contain random data written as part of the initialization process.
As a result, the adversary has no cryptographic rationale for compelling additional
level revelations. Indeed, it should be impossible to prove (for either party) if the
final level is ever revealed.
The basic idea behind our plausible deniability mechanism is to introduce un-
decryptable blocks into DEFY at all levels through normal file system use. These
undecryptable blocks create the necessary obscurity that allows the user to plausibly
deny the existence of additional data stored in unrevealed levels. DEFY creates this
obscurity through the forward-writing nature of log-structured file systems and its
forced delete-on-update policy. Each time a object is modified, a new chunk must
be written to reflect that change. If the change invalidates a previous versions of
the chunk, that chunk is deleted as part of the stub rotation. This creates randomly
placed “holes” in the log that can be explained by normal file system use (see Figure
4.7).
This same mechanism allows multiple levels to be combined in the same logical
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Figure 4.7: A chunk-level view of a file being truncated. As soon as chunk-
266 is deleted, a new metadata chunk is written to the head of the log.
Both of these operations create holes in the log. In this example blocks
are equal to 4 chunks
space. An example of how the blocks could be physically laid out in flash is shown
in Figure 4.8. An adversary cannot gain any information about the unrevealed lev-
els, even when a subset of levels have been revealed. Undecryptable blocks may be
attributed to old versions of data or metadata. The frequency of which, would rely
entirely on the user’s usage patterns, the types of files, and the programs used to
access those files.
Stub Storage Area
To maintain deniability against the strongest type of adversary, the user needs to
periodically randomize the unused sections of the stub storage area. As previously
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Figure 4.8: A multi-level view of blocks in DEFY.
discussed, an attacker could infer information if sections of the stub storage area
remain static. Our recommendation is for the user to randomize the stub storage
area after each suspected device inspection. Such a randomization schedule would
ensure that even a snapshotting adversary would be unable to determine which levels
of the file system were static and which were active. This operation is not required
for the single-visit adversary.
A user could employ the alternative strategy of writing data to a high level and
letting it remain static thereafter. The snapshot adversary without drive images be-
fore the high level writes could be more easily convinced that the file system contained
a subset of the actual set of privilege levels.
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CHAPTER 5
Evaluation
Testing
We wrote DEFY on top of the YAFFS and WhisperYaffs source code. DEFY
was built and tested on a Ubuntu 13.04 machine. That machine was run in a virtual
machine with 4GB of memory and a single emulated processor. We used Oracle’s
VM VirtualBox 4.3.6 to handle the emulation. The host machine ran Windows 8
with an Intel 2.8 GHz quad-core processor. The hosted machine’s Linux kernel was
modified from Linux 3.8 to allow the loading of unsigned kernel modules–like DEFY.
DEFY was tested with the MTD device simulator nandsim [3]. We used nandsim to
test DEFY with a number of different NAND configurations. For the testing results
below we emulated a 64 megabyte device with 2048 byte pages.
The same setup was used to test WhisperYaffs [7], YAFFS [13], ext3 and ext4. The
version of YAFFS that we used lacks a specific version number, but it was committed
on the 10th of August, 2013 to the YAFFS repository. Our version of WhisperYaffs
was created by merging the alpha version of WhisperYaffs from GitHub with our
version of YAFFS. Finally, we used the versions of ext3 and ext4 that were included
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with the 3.8 kernel.
The version of DEFY that we test here is limited to keeping all of the chunk stubs
in memory at all times. As a result, we found that the total file size that DEFY could
store was limited to about 2 megabytes. In future we plan to modify DEFY to allow
it to remove keys from memory and then intelligently re-fetch them from disk when
needed.
Basic Tests
We first ran defy through the Connectathon tool [4]. Successfully passing Con-
nectathon shows that DEFY complies with all standard file system operations. This
verification step was not run on the other comparison file systems.
Performance Tests
Performance was not the focus of this file system, but it was a consideration. We
chose to test DEFY’s performance using IOZone and FFSB. Each tool tests the file
system differently. FFSB uses time as the input metric, where IOZone uses data as
the input metric.
FFSB
FFSB benchmarks file systems by holding time constant and measuring the volume
of disk accesses that are possible in that time [24]. That is, it reads and writes data
until a timer expires, instead of reading and writing a finite amount of data. We
limited our runs to 1 second due to the higher speed file systems. If the time was set
any longer the emulated drive would run out of space. Our results from FFSB are
shown in figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: The performance of a number of file systems as measured by
FFSB.
IOZone
Unlike FFSB, IOZone tests how long it takes to write a set amount of data to a
device–perhaps the more conventional benchmarking method. Again, note that we
limited the tests to 2 megabytes in size. The outputs from these tests can be seen in
figure 5.2.
For each test category, IOZone attempts that operation on a number of uniformly
sized files up to some maximum size. For example, for a 64 kilobyte sized file test it
would try to write sixteen 4 kilobyte files, eight 8 kilobyte files, and so on up to one
64 kilobyte file. For each category, we averaged all of the transaction speeds within
each file system. An example of one of IOZone’s outputs is shown in table 5.1.
The write category measures both the speed at which a new file is created and
written to. This is dissimilar to FFSB, which measures those indicators separately.
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Figure 5.2: The performance of a number of file systems as measured by
IOZone (note the log scale).
The read category is simply the speed at which files were read. Fwrite and Fread are
the same as write and read except that they use buffered library calls. Each of these
categories is discussed in more depth on IOZone’s website and in their documentation
[29].
Discussion
We tested DEFY against the other aforementioned file systems assuming that it
would be slower. What we were interested in was how much introducing deniability
would slow it down. In particular, we were interested in how DEFY would compare to
WhisperYaffs, its most realistic competitor. Both WhisperYaffs and DEFY encrypt
each chunk as it is written to disk and decrypt it after it is read from disk. DEFY then
adds on the additional tasks of stub creation and management. YAFFS is obviously
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Write Size
File Size 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512
64 28021 28382 26501 33559 38116
128 26084 26772 34820 26348 28809 31794
256 29297 29439 27482 30527 28070 28315 27853
512 27563 19444 18056 26590 26924 29377 26788 27938
1024 27368 25742 19303 28090 27816 27804 28331 26732
2048 28195 27689 24718 27290 28114 23215 24843 24302
Average Speed = 27.4 KB/s and Standard Deviation = 3.42 KB/s
Table 5.1: IOZone write benchmark result for the DEFY file system
the root of both WhisperYaffs and DEFY, but it does not include any encryption so
it is understandably much faster. We also included results from the Ext3 and Ext4
journaling file systems. Ext4 is used with increasing frequency on mobile devices
despite its lack of sensitivity for flash memory.
Emulation both on the behalf of the machine and the flash device doubtlessly
introduced inconsistencies in our performance data. Nonetheless, we compared all of
the file systems on the same system with the same amount of load so that they would
all be similarly encumbered.
FFSB’s output matches what we would expect from WhisperYaffs, YAFFS, ext3,
and ext4. We expected YAFFS, ext3, and ext4 to be faster than either WhisperYaffs
or DEFY. We also expected WhisperYaffs and DEFY to be comparable given that
they both have an encryption step for every chunk that is written to the device.
Finally, DEFY should be slightly slower than WhisperYaffs due to its in-memory
stub operations.
IOZone, however, produced less agreeable results. Due to our file-size restrictions,
IOZone was operating at its minimum accepted test size. It also produced a warning
that some of its output would be unreliable. Indeed, the read tests seemed to lack
resolution as they were unable to distinguish between ext3 and ext4. Because of this
inconsistency, we chose to discard IOZone’s read tests from our final evaluation, but
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we still included them here for the sake of completeness. The write tests, however,
were closer to FFSB’s output. They ranked DEFY as being twice as slow as Whis-
perYaffs on average. They also ranked both WhisperYaffs and DEFY as being much
slower than the other three file systems, which was expected.
Combining the data from all of FFSB’s tests and IOZone’s write tests we can say
that FFSB runs one to two times slower than WhisperYaffs. In our opinion this is a
more than acceptable trade off for the added benefits of deniability.
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CHAPTER 6
Future Work
There are a number of ways that DEFY could be modified for future use. We
discuss a few of them below.
Stub Caching
We maintained the YAFFS design of storing all metadata in memory while adding
greatly to the size of that metadata with stubs. As a result, DEFY can only han-
dle files up to 2 megabytes in size. This number could be drastically increased by
decreasing the number of stubs in memory. DEFY already stores all of the needed
stubs on the device and in the stub storage area, so the only necessary modification
is adding a better memory manager that manages which stubs are in memory at all
times. Unfortunately, such a change would decrease the performance of DEFY, but
it would also make it much more practical for today’s larger file sizes.
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Internal Deniable File System
We would have liked to remove the need for an external file system that supported
secure deletion. This modification is straightforward and was left out due to time
constraints. It would require that the top-level stub file was written to special stub
blocks on the file system. Each time a stub was changed, its containing block should
be erased and re-written in a new location. The old block would then need to be
re-written with encrypted random data, just like any other unused block in the file
system. This would ensure that old key data was destroyed. The choice of the next
block to use for a stub block could simply align with the next available block on
the device—provided by the allocator. This would align with our current deniability
model and maintain even device wear.
One drawback of this system is that the blocks that were used to store top-level
stubs would experience slightly more wear than normal blocks. Each time the stub
block is rotated forward, it must be erased and rewritten with random data, which
is one additional write cycle compared to normal data blocks. We must rewrite the
stub blocks because they are encrypted with the level key only.
Other Device Types
The assumptions necessary for a deniable flash file system are more strict than
those for a block-device file system. Indeed, DEFY could be modified to work with
block devices. Such a file system would not receive the benefit of even wear, but it
would be deniable. This modification would be less beneficial if the underlying device
was a disk drive. Disk drives are not designed for random access so the large number
of holes that DEFY creates would be detrimental to read times. This modification
would be useful if the underlying device was still flash memory. An example use case
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is USB sticks, which use a block device layer, but are still flash memory. Note that
in such a situation, DEFY would still need a file system with secure deletion to store
the key file.
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CHAPTER 7
Related Work
Other Deniable File Systems
Anderson, Needham, Shamir
The idea for a plausibly deniable file system was introduced by Anderson et al. [15]
in 1998. They presented two competing constructions. The first was steganographic,
it hid data inside of other valid data. The second hid data inside of a large amount of
random data. Time has shown the second option to be more popular, it is emulated
by the majority of deniable file systems–including DEFY.
Their first design hid data within a valid-looking set of (“cover files”). Each file
in the file system could be reconstructed by XORing certain parts of the cover files
together. How the cover files were superimposed on each other was determined by a
matrix key. For this to work properly, the cover files needed to be much larger than
the hidden files.
The second design placed valid data inside of a large volume of random data.
Each block of data was encrypted before it was added to the device so that it would
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blend in with the random data. The exact block number where data is stored is
dependent on a pseudo-random number generator that was seeded with the file name
of the data. Each block of data is then encrypted with a level key. Thus, to access a
block of data the user must provide a file name and the level key.
Each new block that is added to the device could overwrite existing data. The
probability of collision is the same as the probability of a collision in the birthday
problem [1]. To mitigate the problem, Anderson et al. duplicate data into multiple
blocks.
McDonald and Kuhn
McDonald and Kuhn released a file system called StegFS. It was based closely on
Anderson’s second construction and the ext2 file system [27]. They did away with
purely pseudo-random block placement and added a block allocation table. This
allowed users to access their files without needing to store file names. The potential
for overwriting still exists in this file system and the authors again chose to mitigate
it using duplicated blocks.
Pang, Tan, and Zhou
Pang, Tan, and Zhou, introduced a deniable file system with an unencrypted
global bitmap of used blocks in the file system [30]. They also named it StegFS.
Their bitmap does leak information about the maximum amount of data that could
be in the file system even if no keys are available. In return, this file system ensures
that files cannot be overwritten. The authors augment their deniability using dummy
blocks and abandoned blocks. As the block names suggest, the file system never
accesses abandoned blocks after they are allocated and it randomly updates dummy
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blocks with random data.
Skillen and Mannan
Mobiflage is a deniable file system for Android devices that was introduced by
Skillen and Mannan [40]. Their file system hides the deniable drive in a standard
encrypted file system. They introduced deniability by placing the start to the deniable
drive somewhere in the third quarter of the drive’s address space. The exact location
was based on a hash of the encryption key.
The system works at the block device layer; thus, when used with flash storage,
the write leveling systems may potentially undermine the deniability of the hidden
filesystem, revealing recent activity on the hidden portion of the drive. Further, their
system only supports one deniability level and cannot be trivially extended to provide
additional levels.
Comparison
It is our belief that DEFY provides a number of features that have not previously
been explored in deniable file systems. We compare the features of DEFY to the
aforementioned other deniable file systems in table 7. We also discuss the features
that we are comparing against, except for those that we already discussed in the
background section.
Number of Deniable Levels
The concept of a deniability level was introduced in previous deniable file systems
implementations [15, 27, 30]. A deniability level is a collection of files that form a
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DEFY Skillen Pang McDonald Anderson:
[40] [30] [27] 1 [15] 2 [15]
Single-Visit Strong ! ! ! ! ! !
Snapshot Strong ! !
Arbitrary No.
of Levels ! ! ! ! !
Authenticated
Encryption !
Zero Data Loss & ! ! * * !
Wear Leveling !
(*) these filesystems experience low but probabilistic data loss
(&) DEFY may experience data loss in specific circumstances (see 4)
Table 7.1: Feature comparison between DEFY and previous deniable file
systems.
sensitivity equivalence class (e.g. love letters vs. trade secrets). Here, as in previous
work, deniability levels form a total order: `0 ≤ `1 ≤ . . . ≤ `h. A user has some se-
cret password to reveal all files at a chosen deniability level. Following a convenience
established in previous work, when revealing a level, all lower levels should also re-
vealed. The system should support an arbitrary number of named deniability levels
that can be created dynamically, rather a fixed number of levels or levels created
exclusively during initialization–both of which impose an artificial restriction on the
system’s use and leave a user vulnerable to coercion by an intelligent adversary.
Overwriting
Data loss occurs when hidden data (unrevealed data at a high deniability level) is
overwritten because the file system is mounted at a lower level—an unfortunate, but
unavoidable characteristic of any deniable file system. The ability or the probability
of a file system overwriting data is entirely dependent on its design. One strategy
to prevent overwriting is to maintain a global list of memory blocks that are free
for writing (not in use by any higher or lower levels); a strategy similar to this is
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employed by Pang et al. [30]. Alone, this strategy undermines plausible deniability:
a single-view adversary learns which blocks are in-use across the system, revealing
if hidden levels exist. The remedy in Pang is to create abandoned blocks, or blocks
that are falsely marked as in-use. This creates plausible deniability, at the expense
of permanently sacrificing capacity. Anderson et al. [15] prevent data loss in their
system through block replication, similarly suffering a significant overhead to prevent
data loss. While the capacity of NAND drives is increasing and prices decreasing, the
cost-per-byte for flash memory still almost double that of hard disk devices, limiting
the appeal of solutions with high storage overheads. What’s more, storage devices
that employ wear-leveling preclude file systems from modifying data in place or at
completely random locations. This entirely excludes data recovery strategies based on
random placement of replicas, or using recovering overwritten blocks from n-out-of-m
threshold-based error correction codes.
Wear Leveling
NAND flash has a limit to the number of times data can be written to a block
before it fails. To delay failure, many devices implement wear leveling, in which
all writes are systematically written to new locations, preventing some blocks from
failing far earlier than others. This has implications for both encrypting and deniable
file systems: wear-leveling mechanisms may persist old version of encrypted data,
providing an adversary with a time-line of changes made to disk, and thus, an ability
to differentiate between claimed and actual disk activity. Wear-leveling undermines
any file system whose security is predicated on the ability to overwrite data. Any
secure file system designed for flash-based storage should be secure and compatible
with drives that either do or do not manage their own wear leveling.
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Easily Deployable
To have the broadest impact, a deniable file system should be easily distributable
and compatible with popular operating systems (e.g. Android and Linux). Using a
loadable kernel module to extend the existing kernel allows for systems enhancements
without rebuilding from source.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
In this work we proposed the design for a new deniable file system dubbed DEFY.
DEFY is strong against both the snapshot and the single-view adversaries. It provides
wear-leveling, secure deletion, authenticated encryption, multiple deniable levels, and
mitigated data loss. The deniability of DEFY resides in the undecryptable blocks
that are created by the combination of the forward-writing nature of a log-structured
file system and normal user interactions. We built a prototype version of DEFY and
found that it performed comparably to WhisperYaffs—its closest competitor—when
benchmarked with both the FFSB and the IOZone test suites. We believe that this
is a valuable contribution to the existing collection of deniable file systems, and we
propose that it is even strong enough to defend against the snapshot adversary. To
our knowledge there is only one other deniable file system that reaches this level of
security.
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A: Old Design
We document our original vulnerable idea for DEFY below with the hope that it
will not be reattempted in the future.
Our initial idea for DEFY was to use randomly placed dummy blocks to conseal
data. The idea of a dummy block was inspired by the work of Pang et al. [30]. Apart
from that, this version of DEFY is unique. The idea is detailed below along with its
vulnerability.
Design
The chunk allocator in YAFFS assigns writable chunks out of a single block that
is currently in the ”allocating” state. In this design, each time a block was allocated
a random number (including zero) of chunks would be assigned to each active–or
currently opened–level of the file system, including a dummy level. Any chunks
assigned to the dummy level were filled with random data. We allowed the over
levels to use chunks from that block based on their random allocation. The allocator
ordered chunks in the block based on which level they were assigned to, see figure
8.1. If a level needed more chunks, then a new block had to be allocated, which led
to multiple blocks being open for allocation at the same time.
Vulnerability
We believed that randomizing and ordering blocks would create the required ob-
scurity and security for a deniable file system. The user and adversary would always
expect to find a random number of dummy chunks in any one allocation block, priv-
ileged data could then hide in that margin of expected dummy chunks.
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Erase Block
Chunks (bitmap):
L1 L2
L3 L3 D D D D
D D D D D D
L3 L3 L3 L3 L3 L3
L3 L3 L3 L3
Ln == Level n
D == Dummy 
Chunk
Figure 8.1: A possible allocation of chunks in an erase block.
The problem is, if an adversary had a sufficient number of blocks she can look
at the average distribution of blocks to any one level. The adversary would expect
to find an even distribution of the known levels in the file system, if something else
was found, it would be unpleasant for the user. A potential solution to this is to
allocate chunks for all possible levels, but that would severely diminish the available
disk space. We thus determined that this problem could be better solved through
other deniability mechanisms.
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